

Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-11 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

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R 131923Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0670

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MONTEVIDEO 0581

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REF SHOULD BE 472 VICE 616)

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS AND AMBASSADOR MAILLARD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OAS, UY

SUBJ: FONMINISTER BLANCO'S COMMENTS ON OAS REFORM

REF: MONTEVIDEO 472

1. FONMINISTER BLANCO GAVE ME TODAY AN INFORMAL MEMORANDUM OF
OBSERVATIONS ON THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAD PUT FORWARD FOR
DISCUSSION REGARDING OAS CHARTER REFORM. THE TRANSLATED TEXT OF THES
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OBSERVATIONS FORMS THE CONCLUDING PART OF THIS TELEGRAM.

IN ACCOMPANYING COMMENTARY, BLANCO MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

A) URUGUAY DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PERMANENT
COUNCIL BE ABOLISHED. RATHER, URUGUAY FEELS THAT SUCCESSFUL
REORGANIZATION OF THE OAS WILL RESULT IN A PERMANENT COUNCIL
WHICH WILL BE USEFUL AND HAVE THE POWER AND ABILITY TO DEAL PROPERLY
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WITH PROBLEMS, UNLIKE WHAT HAS BEEN THE CASE, THE GOU FULLY

AGREES, IN A RECENT PAST. OBSERVATIONS ON THIS POINT ARE CONTAINED IN PARA 3 OF THE MEMORANDUM.

B) URUGUAY STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INCORPORATION OF CANADA AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE OAS AS OUTLINED IN PARA 10 OF THE MEMORANDUM.

2. BLANCO CALLED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FINAL PARA OF HIS MEMORANDUM ENTITLED "UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS". A MAJOR REASON WHY THE OAS, ESPECIALLY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL, HAS BEEN UNABLE EFFECTIVELY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF REFORM, HE SAID, HAS BEEN THE GENERAL SENSE OF TENSION AND CONFRONTATION WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED THE HEMISPHERIC POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THIS TASK WAS UNDERTAKEN. REFORM EFFORT WAS BEGUN, HE NOTED, AT A TIME OF US STRAIN WITH CHILE, DURING THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT; AT A TIME OF GROWING TENSION WITH PERU AND VENEZUELA OVER PHILOSOPHICAL AND INVESTMENT ISSUES; AT A TIME INCREASING TENSION WITH ECUADOR ON THE TUNA QUESTION; AND WITH PANAMA OVER THE CANAL ISSUE, AND WITH OTHERS OVER THE DEVISIVE ISSUE OF CUBA. AS A RESULT, MANY COUNTRIES ATTEMPTED TO WRITE INTO CHARTER REFORM THE SOLUTION OF THEIR PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AND HAVE USED THE PERMANENT COUNCIL AS A FORUM IN WHICH TO AIR THEIR GRIEVANCES IN AN EVER MORE STRIDENT AND IRRESPONSIBLE WAY. THE PROBLEM, THEREFORE, HE SAYS, IS NOT THAT THE PERMANENT COUNCIL IS USELESS AND SHOULD BE ABOLISHED; BUT THAT THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH SO THAT A RESTRUCTURED COUNCIL WITH DIFFERENT POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES COULD OPERATE EFFECTIVELY. HE SEES THE EFFORTS OF THE US IN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, THE NEW DIALOGUE, AND THE THRUST OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S UPCOMING VISITS AS BEING AIMED AT DEALING WITH THIS UNDERLYING ATMOSPHERE. SERIOUS INSISTENCE BY THE US THAT THE PERMANENT COUNCIL BE ABOLISHED, BLANCO FEARS, WOULD LEAD TO RESENTMENT AND RESISTANCE HARMFUL TO THE OVERALL AIM OF CONSTRUCTIVE OAS REFORM.

3. BLANCO SAID HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF COSTA RICA, BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS BUT SO FAR HAS SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THROUGH ONLY TO LIEVANO. HE SAID THAT LIEVANO AGREED COMPLETELY WITH HIS IDEAS AS EXPRESSED IMMEDIATELY ABOVE AND TOLD HIM

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THAT HE INTENDED TO TAKE A SIMILAR LINE WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER.

4. BLANCO FINALLY EXPRESSED AGAIN HIS KEEN APPRECIATION FOR HIS HAVING BEEN BROUGHT IN TO THIS EARLY CONSULTATION BY THE US. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS THIS A DEMONSTRATION OF RESPECT FOR URUGUAY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE IN WHICH HE, PERSONALLY, IS SO KEENLY INTERESTED. HE HOPES THAT HIS COMMENTARIES, AS WE HAD HOPED FOR OUR OWN,

WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. BEGIN QUOTE OF GOU MEMO:

TOWARDS A CONCILIATION OF POINTS OF VIEW.

1. THE OAS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED:

A. INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE CONTINENT (RIO TREATY)

B. FORUM FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES.

C. MECHANISM TO ORGANIZE HEMISPHERIC COOPERATION IN DIVERSE FIELDS.

D. TANGIBLE EXPRESSION OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONS" IN THE HEMISPHERE.

2. THE WEAKENING (AND OF COURSE THE DISAPPEARANCE) OF THIS ORGANIZATION WOULD THREATEN NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES:

A. LATIN AMERICA WOULD INTERPRET IT AS A SIGN OF DISINTEREST ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AND AS A FORM OF "DIVIDING TO CONQUER" ON A NEW BILATERAL PLANE.

B. THERE WOULD BE LOST A FORUM NOTABLY MORE EQUANIMOUS AND MODERATE - IN SPITE OF EVERYTHING - THAN THE UNITED NATIONS.

C. THE MULTILATERAL GRAVITATION OF CUBA IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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HEMISPHERE WOULD BE ACCENTUATED THROUGH SELA AT THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE INTERAMERICAN ORGAN WHICH SERVES AS AN ELEMENT OF BALANCE.

D. THE POSITIVE ASPECTS IN ITEM 1 ABOVE WOULD BE LOST.

3. IN THIS CONTEXT ELIMINATION OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL WOULD BE NEGATIVE:

A. WITH THE PC THE OAS WOULD BE REDUCED TO AN ANNUAL ASSEMBLY, MEETINGS OF AMBASSADORS IN THE HOST COUNTRY (BASICALLY DEDICATED TO BILATERAL RELATIONS), TO MEETINGS OF TECHNICAL COMMITTEES AND TO WORK OF THE SECRETARIAT. THIS SCHEME IS SIMILAR TO ORIGINS OF THE SYSTEM WITH

THE INTERAMERICAN CONFERENCE AND THE OFFICE OF
THE PAN AMERICAN UNION. THIS WILL BE INTERPRETED
AS AN INVOLUTION OR WEAKENING.

B. A POLITICAL STAGE WOULD DISAPPEAR WHICH, WHILE
ACCUSTOMED TO BEING UTILIZED UNDULY FOR CONFRONTA-
TION OR FOR STERILE PROCEDURAL DEBATES, SYMBOLIZES,
NEVERTHELESS, WITH ITS PERMANENT CHARACTER, THE
PECIAL INTERAMERICAN RELATIONS AND EXPRESSES A
DESIRE TO FORM A HEMISPHERIC "CLUB."

C. EVEN WHEN THE PC - FOR REASONS EXPRESSED - IS NOT
AS EFFICIENT AS IT OUGHT TO BE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO
GIVE IT GREATER DYNAMISM AND UTILITY:

- I. SIMPLIFYING ITS PROCEDURES
- II. REMOVING MINOR FUNCTIONS FROM IT
- III. DELEGATING PC POWER IN THE PRESIDENT
- IV. PUTTING IN IT LAP TRULY SIGNIFICANT
ITEMS WHICH GIVE IT A NEW PROMINENCE
- V. ENTRUSTING IT TO FOLLOW UP ALL RELEVANT
ITEMS WITH POWERS TO DECIDE

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R 131923Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0671

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MONTEVIDEO 0581

4. THE ACTUAL DIVISION INTO THREE POLITICAL COUNCILS SHOULD NOT BE KEPT. DURING THE LABORS OF THE CEESI AND OF THE PC WITH RESPECT TO THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SYSTEM, TWO TENDENCIES SLIPPED IN:

A. TO MAINTAIN THE THREE COUNCILS

B. TO ESTABLISH TWO; THE PC AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

URUGUAY SUPPORTED THE SECOND POSITION.

5. NOW ON THE BASIS OF CONVERSATIONS SUGGESTED - TOGETHER WITH THE SUPPRESSION OF THE COUNCILS - THERE IS MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING COMMITTEES OF EXPERTS WHICH APPARENTLY WOULD ASSUME SOME OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL. THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE CREATED.

6. THE COMMITTEES CAN BE A POSITIVE IDEA PROVIDED THEY DO NOT REPLACE THE POLITICAL LEVEL. IF CONCEIVED AS SUBSTITUTES, THEY WILL AWAKEN A NEGATIVE REACTION IN LA AS
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EXPLAINED IN 3 ABOVE, FOR THE REASONS THERE INDICATED, (AND) TO WHICH WILL BE ADDED IN THIS CASE THE CRITICISM THAT THE USA WANTS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ITS DIALOGUE WITH LA PRECISELY IN THE DEVELOPMENT AREA. IF THE COMMITTEES ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO A POLITICAL COUNCIL, THERE CAN BE LIFTED FROM THEM A GREAT DEAL OF WORK WHICH WOULD THUS ASSUME A MORE TECHNICAL FORM AND CONTENT. THE POLITICAL ORGANS WOULD LIMIT THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISHING GENERAL LINES, BROAD POLICY ORIENTATION, LEAVING THE TECHNICAL WORK TO THE COMMITTEES. (NOTE: YOU CANNOT DISCOUNT A PRACTICAL ASPECT FOR MANY LA COUNTRIES: THE COST OF PARTICIPATION IN COMMITTEES DUE TO TRAVEL COSTS OF NUMEROUS EXPERTS. ALSO, THE CONCRETE POSSIBILITY OF BEING ABLE TO COME UP WITH SUFFICIENT EXPERTS FOR PROLONGED TASKS AWAY FROM THEIR HOME COUNTRIES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.)

7. FROM THE STRUCTURAL POINT OF VIEW THE QUESTION OF HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OR COUNCILS SEEMS TO BE MOST IMPORTANT. FOR REASONS STATED IN 3 ABOVE, THE EXISTENCE OF THIS STAGE IN HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY. IT CAN TAKE THREE DIVERSE FORMS. THE FIRST TWO HAVE BEEN COMMENTED ON DURING THE REFORM PROCESS. THE THIRD IS A NEW SUGGESTION:

A. TO MAINTAIN THE THREE PRESENT COUNCILS. RE-
JECTED, AS IT IMPLIES AN INCONVENIENT DISPERSION

B. TWO PERMANENT COUNCILS, ONE POLITICAL AND
THE OTHER FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.
URUGUAY SUPPORTED THIS SOLUTION AND IN ATLANTA
PRESENTED AN ORIGINAL IDA AS TO THE MANNER
IN WHICH THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OUGHT TO FUNCTION:

I. A FORUM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
HEMISPHERIC POLICIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT FIELD.

II. A MECHANISM FOR AGREEING ON CONCRETE
DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS.

III. THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNCTIONING, DE-
PENDING ON SUBJECT, WITH ALL MEMBERS,
BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (ANDEAN, CUENCA
DEL PLATA, CARIBBEAN, ETC.) OR EVEN ONLY

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WITH LATIN AMERICANS. IN THIS WAY, THE
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL WOULD BE ENDOWED
WITH GREAT FLEXIBILITY TO SEEK, IN EACH
MATTER, AGREEMENT AMONG COUNTRIES REALLY
INTERESTED AND IN ACCORD, WITHOUT FORCING
ALL TO PARTICIPATE.

IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATION OF
AGENCIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANS AND DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES FROM OTHER AREAS IN MEETINGS AND
ACCORDS OF THE COUNCIL, ACCORDING TO THE
CASE. (NOTE: IN LARGE MEASURE, THIS
FORM OF OPERATING WAS PUT INTO THE
SELA STATUTES.

C. ONE SINGLE PERMANENT COUNCIL WITH THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE THREE ACTUAL. WOULD FUNCTION ALTERNATIVELY
AT DIFFERENT LEVELS AND WITH A VARYING COMPOSI-
TION, ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF THE MATTER.
THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLICY
OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
THE PC AT THE MINISTER OF ECONOMICS LEVEL; THE
FOLLOWING UP OF A DECISION OF THE GA, WHATEVER
THE MATTER, WOULD BE AT THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADORS
(PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES); A DISCUSSION ABOUT
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE AMERICAS COULD BE HELD
IN THE PC AT THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE LEVEL.
THAT IS TO SAY, A SINGLE ORGAN INTEGRATED IN
DIFFERENT WAYS ACCORDING TO NEED. THE PC WOULD
BE, IN PRINCIPLE, LIKE THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE
OF THE GA, WITH FULL POWERS WHEN THIS BODY IS NOT
IN SESSION. THE PC, WITH THIS CONCEPT, ALSO COULD

FUNCTION IN THE SAME FORM AND WITH THE SAME FACULTIES
SUGGESTED BY URUGUAY IN ATLANTA FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT COUNCIL (SUMMARIZED IN B ABOVE).

8. URUGUAY EXPRESSELY SUPPORTS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE
GENERAL SECRETARIAT; A SUBSTANTIVE REFORM IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES WHICH MIGHT REDUCE OPERATING COSTS; RENEWAL
OF THE PERSONNEL WITH CRITERIA OF HIGH TECHNICAL
CAPACITY; CONCENTRATION ON ACTIVITIES IN KEY AREAS,
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ABANDONING MARGINAL FIELDS. IT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY
TO GIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE NECESSARY POWERS
TO INTRODUCE THESE AND OTHER ANALOGOUS REFORMS TO CARRY
ON PLANS AND PROGRAMS UNDER HIS CHARGE WITH VIGOR.

9. THE SUGGESTIONS ON ARTICLE 8 CAN BE STUDIED WITH A
POSITIVE OUTLOOK (PROVIDED THEY DO NOT PROVOKE SPLITS);
REDUCTION OF THE MAJORITY FOR BRINGING IN NEW MEMBERS AND
A SPECIAL STATUTE OF ASSOCIATION (MINI-STATES). THIS
LAST POINT IS JUDGED TO BE OF THE MOST IMPORTANCE AS NOT
INTRODUCING A RESTRICTION COULD DISFIGURE THE CHARACTER
OF THE OAS. ON THE OTHER TWO, IT DOES NOT SEEM INDISPEN-
SABLE TO MAKE AN EFFORT IF SOUNDINGS INDICATE STRONG
RESISTANCE (ACTUALLY, THIS IS WHAT SEEMS TO BE OCCURRING
NOW).

10. FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT IS NECESSARY
TO MAKE A REAL EFFORT TO BRING CANADA FULLY INTO THE
SYSTEM. THIS MOVE, PERHAPS, MIGHT BE THE ONLY ONE CAPABLE
OF BRINGING ABOUT BY ITSELF, A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE
ATMOSPHERE OF THE OAS, DILUTING THE CLASSIC SCHEME OF
RELATIONS - SYSTEMATIC CONFRONTATION-WHICH HAS PREVAILED.
URUGUAY HAS WORKED AND IS WORKING IN THIS SENSE WITHIN
ITS POSSIBILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE: PERMANENT SUPPORT FOR AND
PROMOTION OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN DIVERSE
ORGANS OF THE SYSTEM; VIGOROUS ACTION IN BID WITH THE
SAME END; BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH CANADA; THE COMING
ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULATE GENERAL IN CANADA
(WITHOUT REQUIRING RECIPROCITY; CONCRETE PROPOSAL
(WHICH WAS ACCEPTED) DURING THE RIO TREATY REFORM TO
INCLUDE CANADA IN THE TREATY'S SECURITY AREA.

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ACTION ARA-10

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R 131923Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0672

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MONTEVIDEO 0581
IN SHORT, THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THIS MEMORANDUM
ARE MEANT TO CONCILIATE THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ASPECTS:
TO CONCENTRATE AUTHORITY IN A PC CAPABLE OF ACTING ON
VARIOUS LEVELS AND WITH FLEXIBILITY:

- A. TO DEPRIVE THAT ORGANS OF PROCEDURAL MATTERS AND
OF DETAIL.
- B. TO GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PC CERTAIN
POWERS OF DECISION.
- C. TO STRENGTHEN THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT; TO
CONCENTRATE AND TO IMPROVE ITS SERVICES.
- D. TO INSTALL TECHNICAL COMMITTEES UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF THE PC OR THE GA.
- E. TO GIVE CONTENT TO HEMISPHERIC ACTION;
BRINGING UP AT THE OAS THE MOST RELEVANT
SUBJECTS AT PRINCIPALLY INFORMAL MEETINGS.
- F. TO CREATE A NEW POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE WITH THE
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ENTRANCE OF CANADA AND WITH THE MORE ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION OF OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF GREATER OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.
IN THIS SENSE, THE PC WOULD ACT AS A NUCLEUS
AROUND WHICH ELEMENTS WILL BE INCORPORATED ACCORDING
TO NEEDS (MODULAR CONCEPT).

12. URUGUAY IS READY TO MAINTAIN CONSULTATIONS WITH AN
OPEN MIND ON THESE AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF THE CHARTER
REFORM, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO LOOK
FOR A SOLID CONSENSUS.

UNDERLYING ASPECTS

THE PRECEDING CONSIDERATIONS ARE MEANT TO RECONCILE
IDEAS AROUND THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE OAS. NEVER-
THELESS, THIS IS ONLY PART OF THE QUESTION.

IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT
THE REFORM PROCESS IN ITSELF WAS INITIATED IN THE CONTEXT OF
AN INTERNAL DISSATISFACTION OF LATIN AMERICA TOWARD THE
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS LOGICAL TO THINK,
THEN, THAT THE CULMINATION OF THIS REFORM PROCESS IS
BASICALLY CONDITIONED BY THE TONE THAT INTERAMERICAN
RELATIONS MIGHT HAVE, MORE THAN FOR THE FORMAL ASPECTS OF
THE OAS STRUCTURE.

IN OTHER WORDS, INASMUCH AS THE CHARACTER AND THE
LEVEL OF THE RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT, THE QUESTION OF THE
TEXT LOSES IMPORTANCE. ON THE CONTRARY, IF THE LEVEL IS
LOW OR UNSATISFACTORY, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND
A SATISFACTORY TEXT.

URUGUAY CONTINUES TO THINK - IN THIS ORDER OF
IDEAS - THAT THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IS INTERAMERICAN
ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THAT IS THE REASON WHY IT HAS
PROPOSED THE IDEA OF FACING THIS PROBLEM DIRECTLY,
LOOKING FOR THE AGREEMENT OF RULES OF BEHAVIOR IN THIS
MATTER WHICH MIGHT BE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY. THIS
PHILOSOPHY INSPIRED THE PROPOSITION OF STUDYING
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POINTS - IN A RESERVED AND TECHNICAL MANNER - AN
'ECONOMIC STATUTE OF THE AMERICAS'. THAT IS WHY IT HAS
ALSO GIVEN DECIDED SUPPORT TO STUDIES OF THE TRANSNATIONALS.
MONTEVIDEO, FEBRUARY 13, 1976 END QUOTE OF
GOU MEMO. SIRACUSA

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